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V 
ARGUMENT 
L DEFENDANTS, AND THE TRIAL COURT, FAILED TO APPLY THE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS TO THE FACTS. 
Appellees' Brief reveals that both Defendants and the trial court failed to properly 
apply the presumptions and burdens that must be applied before a party's claims can be 
dismissed on a motion for summary judgment. This Court's longstanding precedents are 
clear: before a plaintiffs claims can be dismissed on summary judgment, the facts and 
all reasonable inferences therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiffs. See Abdulkadir v. Western Pac. R. Co., 7 Utah 2d 53, 55-56, 318 P.2d 339, 
341 (Utah 1957); see also Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, 2004 UT 85,]} 2, 100 P.3d 
1200. This Court recently clarified the movant's burden: "A summary judgment movant 
must show both that there is no material issue of fact and that the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ]\ 10, 177 P.3d 600 
(emphasis in original). Where the moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, he has 
"an affirmative duty to provide the court with facts that demonstrate both that the party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law and that there are no material issues of fact that 
would require resolution at trial." Id., ]\ 19. Where the moving party challenges a claim 
on which the other party bears the burden of proof at trial, he must do more than merely 
"point[ ] out that the nonmoving party lacks sufficient evidence to support his claim"; he 
must "affirmatively provide factual evidence establishing that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact" Id.,]}]} 16-17. 
1 
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The gravamen of Plaintiffs' Complaint in this matter is that, in the face of 
evidence showing Jeff Howe had every reason to believe a crime was occurring at West 
High School on the morning of June 27, 2003, when he reported the same to Salt Lake 
City Police dispatch, Defendants seized upon misstatements Howe made in the course of 
reporting the crime to Salt Lake City Police dispatch - misstatements that were both 
immaterial and understandable under the circumstances - and proceeded to charge and 
prosecute him for knowingly making a false report of a crime. The evidence shows 
Defendants did so not to bring an offender to justice, but to advance Defendants' 
position, and chill Plaintiffs' and others' opposition, on the important public policy 
question of how best to deal with "false alarms." It also clearly reveals the animus that 
blinded Defendants to reason and caused them to disregard or ignore not only the plain 
language of the statute under which Howe was charged, but also any exculpatory 
information, and to forgo any consideration of the exigent circumstances with which 
Howe was presented when he made his report - circumstances of the very type that 
Defendants' own dispatchers agreed would cause them to err on the side of caution and 
send the police to investigate. 
Plaintiffs presented all this evidence to the trial court. They then accurately 
summarized it, with citations to the record, in the Statement of the Facts in Appellant's 
Brief. The above authority makes clear that this Court must review that evidence in the 
890519 I 
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light most favorable to Plaintiffs. As set forth below, Defendants7 and the trial court's 
failure to properly apply the summary judgment presumptions and burdens resulted in the 
erroneous conclusion that that the evidence fails to establish the lack of probable cause as 
a matter of law, or at the very least raises genuine issues of material fact that preclude 
2 
summary judgment for Defendants. 
A. Plaintiffs Established Lack of Probable Cause as a Matter of 
Law, 
1. Judge IwasakFs ruling conclusively establishes that Defendants 
lacked probable cause. 
Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment that Defendants lacked probable 
cause to charge and prosecute Jeff Howe for making a "false alarm'' in violation of Utah 
1
 Appellees' Brief begins with objections to the captions of Plaintiffs' Statement of the 
Facts, and to certain of the numbered paragraphs in the Statement of the Facts, and asks 
that they, along with two Affidavits submitted by Plaintiffs in opposition to Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, be "stricken or disregarded." (See Appellees' Brief, 
pp. 1-9) Defendants have not made a properly supported Motion to Strike, either with the 
trial court or with this Court. They cannot raise their objections for the first time on 
appeal. See D & L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1989). 
2
 Defendants' objections are also factually incorrect. The serious charge that one of 
Plaintiffs' Statements of Fact "is blatantly false and contrary to the factual record," is 
demonstrably incorrect, as discussed infra at p. 13 and n.6. Objecting to Paragraph 1, 
Defendants state Salt Lake City's adoption of a "verified response" ordinance 
"effectively ended" debate over the wisdom and efficacy of the policy. That is also 
demonstrably false, as Defendants' attacks on the alarm industry's alternative public 
policy proposals, and Plaintiffs' and others' attempts to promote alternatives through the 
exercise of their First Amendment rights, continued right up to the month before Jeff 
Howe's arrest, and even thereafter. (See Appellant's Brief, Statement of the Facts, fflj 5-
10) Among other things, in this time period Defendant Werner asked the Utah Attorney 
General to bring the full power of the State to bear in stopping Plaintiffs and others from 
"go[ing] to City Council and try[ing] to force a reversal of verified response." (/?. 2344) 
890519 \ 
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Code Ann. § 76-9-105. Plaintiffs bore the burden to establish that element of their 
claims. To meet their burden, Plaintiffs showed that Judge Iwasaki's ruling conclusively 
establishes that Defendants lacked probable cause to charge and prosecute Jeff Howe 
with making a "false alarm" as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-105, or indeed for 
"knowingly and intentionally" making any "false representations to Salt Lake City 
dispatch." His ruling has that effect because it not only directed a verdict; it included a 
specific "finding of fact" that "[n]one of the evidence presented by the City established 
Mr. Howe's intent at the time he contacted the Salt Lake City Police dispatch, nor was 
there any evidence presented by the City to establish that Mr. Howe knowingly or 
intentionally made false representations to Salt Lake City dispatch"; and it also included 
the specific conclusion that the City failed to produce any evidence establishing criminal 
intent. (See Appellants' Brief, pp. 28 - 32, addressing effect of Judge Iwasaki's ruling, 
R. 954-59) Appellees' Brief fails to analyze the legal precedents, counter the reasoning, 
or otherwise meaningfully address the substance of Plaintiffs' showing on this point. 
Plaintiffs stand on the analysis in Appellants' Brief. 
Defendants briefly argue, without citing any facts or law, that "estoppel does not 
apply" because the individual Defendants "were not parties to Howe's criminal 
prosecution, and had no opportunity whatsoever to litigate these issues." (See Appellees' 
Brief, pp. 23-25) This is something of a red herring, since it ignores Plaintiffs' main 
point that there is a "strong judicial policy against the creation of two conflicting 
resolutions arising out of the same or identical transaction." Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 
4 
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477, 484 (1994). But it is also incorrect on the merits. This Court also has not 
considered the issue of whether, if the People are judicially determined not to have 
possessed probable cause for arresting the defendant for having allegedly committed the 
crime for which he was arrested, such a determination is binding on the municipality 
whose police officers committed such arrest, and/or on the procuring employees and 
officers. Many courts in other jurisdictions have considered this issue, however, and he 
better reasoned cases, have found such privity. 
3 See Barlindal v. City ofBonney Lake, 925 P.2d 1289 (Wash. App. 1996) ("It is the 
obligation of a county prosecuting attorney to control a felony prosecution; the inability 
of the municipal attorney to control the prosecution does not diminish the common 
interests that both agencies have in the outcome of the prosecution"); Miller v. Superior 
Court, 168 Cal. App. 3d 376 (1985) ("The interest of City was identical to that of the 
People of the State of California in prosecuting Schroyer, and was successfully 
represented by the People in that case . . . whether it be the city attorney or the district 
attorney who pursues the conviction, each has goals which are the same - to seek justice 
on behalf of the People"); lrizarry v. City of New York, 79 Misc. 2d 346, 357 N.Y.S.2d 
756 (1974) ("The fact is that the city has no capacity to institute criminal prosecution in 
its own name even though its enforcement officers, namely, the city police, bring upon 
the institution of criminal proceedings in enforcement of State penal laws. While the 
technical prosecutor in a criminal proceeding is 'The People of the State of New York,' 
its interest is identical to that of the City of New York in enforcing the criminal laws 
within the City of New York. The city had knowledge and control of the facts supporting 
the basic issues involved in the criminal proceeding. It was the city's officers who 
furnished the testimony upon which the prosecution was based."). It is also well 
established that "Governmental officials sued in their official capacities are generally 
considered to be in privity with the governmental entity that they serve." Waldman v. 
Village ofKiryasJoel, 39 F. Supp. 2d 370, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). Accord Balzerzah v. 
City of Milwaukee, 163 F.3d 993, 995-996 (7th Cir. 1998) (police chief found to be in 
privity with city Board of Fire and Police Commissioners; court referred to "the rule that 
a city official sued in his official capacity is generally in privity with the municipality"); 
Gates v. Walker, 865 F. Supp. 1222, 1238 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (referring to the "general 
principle of the law of preclusion that state officials are, as a matter of policy, in privity 
with the agency or department in which they serve"); Doyel v. City ofMarianna, 611 F. 
5 
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2. The undisputed independent facts confirm that Defendants 
lacked probable cause. 
Besides relying on Judge Iwasaki's ruing, Plaintiffs showed the following: 
• The plain language of the statute requires that, to have probable cause to believe 
Jeff Howe made a "false alarm," Defendants must have been able to reasonably 
conclude that when Howe reported a crime at West High School he had no basis 
to believe a crime was occurring. (See R. 787-90; R. 2546-47; see also 
Appellants' Brief, pp. 28-32) 
• As found by Judge Iwasaki, and supported by other evidence, on the morning in 
question, when school was not in session, "there was an alarm at West High 
School, there were two unauthorized individuals on the premises of West High 
School which caused the alarm, and that no one knew what was the intent of the 
individuals, including whether they intended to cause.a theft or commit a felony 
while in the West High School premises, and that Mrs. Hoyt had asked for 
police assistance in removing the individuals from the premises." R. 954-59. 
Supp. 857, 860 (E.D. Ark. 1985) (city building inspector, named in civil lawsuit along 
with city in action based on denial of plaintiff s permit to place a mobile home on her 
property, was "the city official charged with the responsibility of issuing the permit and is 
in privity with the city"); Patzner v. Burkett, 779 F.2d 1363, 1369 fn. 7 (8th Cir. 1985) 
(deputy sheriffs were in privity with the State in a prior criminal action (resulting from an 
arrest they made) which ended in defendant's favor "and thus bound by the state court's 
determination that the arrest was illegal"); Jurkus v. Village of East HazelCrest, 1991 
U.S. Dist. Lexis 9255, at *19 (N.D. 111. 1991) (police officers in privity with the State in a 
prior criminal action (resulting from an arrest that they made), as the prosecution in such 
action functioned as the officers' "virtual representative"). 
6 
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• Salt Lake City police dispatch supervisor Diane Powers testified that, given 
these facts, a dispatcher should dispatch a burglary in progress. (R. 2231) 
• Jeff Howe knew these facts at the time he made his call to police dispatch. 
Likewise, these facts were available to Defendants on contemporaneous 
recordings. But Defendants disregarded the recordings in their investigation and 
their conclusion that probable cause existed to charge and prosecute Jeff Howe 
for making a false alarm. (See R. 2097, p. 166, II 20-25; R. 2098, p. 170, I 9 -
p. 171, I 8; 11 2150-51, p. 105, L 9 ~p. 106, L 16) 
• Salt Lake Police dispatchers agreed that, when persons apparently are in a 
building in which they apparently are not authorized to be, a dispatcher 
should assume criminal intent, erring, if at all, on the side of caution. 
Likewise, the City's own training materials for private guard responders 
instruct: "Always assume that an alarm is a burglary in progress" when 
responding to a burglar alarm. {See R. 845-47, 849\ 950-51, 978, 2211, 
2214-19, 2222-25, 2228) 
All of these facts are confirmed by the substantial independent record Plaintiffs 
gathered in discovery in this matter, and they are undisputed. They show that no one 
could reasonably conclude that Jeff Howe reported a crime at West High School knowing 
his report of a crime was false. Defendants' failed below to meet their burden to create 
any genuine issue as to any of these material facts, and Appellees' Brief does nothing to 
remedy that failure through a proper analysis of the facts in light of the parties' respective 
890519 ! 
burdens. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment should have been 
granted, and the trial court erred in ruling otherwise. 
B. Defendants Failed to Establish the Existence of Probable Cause 
as a Matter of Law. 
Defendants opposed Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and moved 
themselves for Summary Judgment dismissing all of Plaintiffs' claims. As to the issue of 
probable cause, rather than address whether there are genuine issues as to the material 
facts, Defendants attempt to both defeat Plaintiffs' showing the lack of probable cause 
that is required on Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and to meet their 
own burden to show probable cause exists on Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, by means of a single stratagem: urge a judicial rewriting of the statute to 
criminalize any knowingly "false statement," rather than a "false report of a crime." That 
4 
stratagem, on display throughout Appellees' Brief, must fail, for three main reasons. 
1. Defendants fail to show that no jury could conclude an 
experienced officer, acting without Bryant's ulterior motives, 
would not read the false alarm statute as he purported to do. 
4
 See, e.g., Appellees' Brief, p. 8 (extended discussion of Officer Wihongi's conclusion 
that "Jeff Howe knowingly provided false information to SLCPD dispatch"); pp. 9-10 
('The investigating officer concluded that Howe intentionally and knowingly provided 
false information of the crime to police dispatch"); p. 14 (listing allegedly "false 
statements"); pp. 14-15 ("Based on his conversations with Howe and his investigation of 
the West High School incident, Officer Wihongi concluded that Howe intentionally gave 
inaccurate information to SLCPD Dispatch"); p. 17 ("Howe intentionally reported false 
information to SLCPD Dispatch"); p. 20 ("The only requirement is that [Defendants'] 
belief that Howe knowingly or intentionally made false representations be reasonable 
under the circumstances"); p. 22 (discussing the definition of "false statement" under 
Utah law) (all emphases added). 
890519 I 
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While some criminal statutes, and Defendants' own 'Verified response" ordinance, 
may expressly criminalize making a "false statement" or providing "false information" 
(see Appellants' Brief, p. 29, n.8), the false alann statute does not use those terms; it uses 
the word "report." Defendants do not address this Court's clear precedents, which 
require that this Court "assume that each term included in the [statute] was used 
advisedly" (see Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98, % 30, 104 P.3d 1208), and 
which prohibit this Court and any other court from reading into a statute (particularly a 
criminal statute) substantive terms that simply are there (see I.M.L v. State, 2002 UT 
110, T| 29, 61 P.3d 1038). Nor do they address the serious and substantial constitutional 
and public policy implications that would arise from the extra-legislative creation of a 
statute that criminalizes reports of crimes where police response is indeed appropriate, as 
set forth by Plaintiffs. (See Appellants' Brief, pp. 28-30) They simply say any reading 
of the statute that precludes criminalization of any "false statement" amounts to a 
"hypertechnical construction." (See Appellees' Brief, pp. 21-23) 
While officers need not be "legal technicians" or "constitutional scholars," their 
statutory interpretations are not beyond judicial scrutiny, and must meet a minimum 
threshold of legal knowledge. Even an inexperienced officer would know that a "false 
5
 In Melessa v. Randall, a deputy filed an arrest affidavit charging the plaintiff with 
witness tampering, but the statements the plaintiff was alleged to have influence were 
unrelated to any pending charges. The Tenth Circuit therefore ruled that the statute did 
not support the deputy's "interpretation" and ruled that she was not entitled to qualified 
immunity. 121 Fed. Appx. 803, 808 (10th Cir. 2005). See also Grossman v. City of 
Portland, 33 F.2d 1200, 1209 (9th Cir. 1994) ("an officer who unlawfully enforces an 
9 
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report of a crime" is not identical to a "false statement." Bryant, a very experienced 
officer, read several "false statement" statutes and ordinances and properly concluded, 
without even contacting a prosecutor, that they do not apply here. He admitted that the 
"false alarm" statute he ultimately settled upon "is probably most applicable, in my view, 
to - maybe to bomb threats or something like that." (R. 2157, p. 131, L 8 p. 132, I 2) 
Defendants' opposition to Plaintiffs' plain language reading is nothing more than a 
post hoc attempt to rewrite the "false alarm" statute to extend to conduct it cannot 
reasonably or lawfully be construed to cover. At a minimum, the fact that Bryant would 
apply this statute, with its clear language and its equally clear purpose to deter and punish 
those who knowingly report something like a bomb threat - a situation where one is 
reporting an imminent crime or catastrophe knowing there is no such thing - to Jeff 
Howe's report; and that Defendants would be unable to defend his decision on the plain 
language of the statute or to even address the serious constitutional and public policy 
consequences of the extra-legislative statutory revision they urge; reveals that Plaintiffs' 
core claim in this case is something a jury needs to decide - whether Bryant's decision 
ordinance in a particularly egregious manner, or in a manner which a reasonable officer 
would recognize exceeds the bounds of the ordinance, will not be entitled to immunity 
even if there is no clear case law declaring the ordinance or the officer's particularly 
conduct unconstitutional."); Cyprus v. Diskin, 936 F. Supp. 259 (1996) (ruling that "As a 
matter of statutory interpretation, the reading advanced by [the officers] is patently 
incorrect" and holding that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity as a 
result); Robinson v. White Countyt Ark, 452 F.3d 706 (8th Cir. 2006) ("[W]e do not 
believe the absence of interpretation by state courts grants imprimatur to a statutory 
reading so contrary to common sense. Because no reasonable officer would have read 
the [statute] in a manner to believe probable cause arguably existed to arrest [the 
plaintiff)," the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity). 
890519 I 
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was driven not by a proper law enforcement purpose, but for the ulterior motive of 
advancing Defendants' public policy position on "verified response." 
2. Even if the statute could be read as Defendants contend, 
Defendants have not met the remaining burden applicable to 
their Motion for Summary Judgment. 
In seeking dismissal of Plaintiffs' probable cause-related claims on their Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Defendants had the burden to show that there is no genuine issue 
of material fact, and that as a matter of law they had a reasonable basis to conclude, that 
the statements on which they based their probable cause determination were knowingly 
false. In this regard, Defendants are simply incorrect that Plaintiffs "must allege and 
prove that Defendants lacked probable cause to cite and prosecute Jeff Howe," and that 
"Plaintiffs erroneously place the burden of proof on Defendants regarding probable 
cause." (See Appellees' Brief, pp. 11, 34-35) As set forth in the above discussion of the 
applicable summary judgment standards, for purposes of their Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Defendants do indeed bear the burden to establish that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact bearing on the existence of probable cause, and they must do 
so in the face of the requirement that the facts, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, 
must be construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. Defendants' and the trial 
court's failure to articulate and apply the appropriate presumptions and burdens resulted 
in reversible error. 
In analyzing whether Defendants met their burden on their Motion for Summary 
Judgment, it is important to focus on the statements Defendants actually relied on at the 
11 
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time for their probable cause determination. Defendant Bryant set forth only two 
statements in his contemporaneous report as the basis for probable cause: 
I noted that AP Jeff Howe had provided false information to 
SLCPD dispatch in order to get a police response to West 
High. The false information provided was that an employee 
or agent of Peak Alarm was on the scene, and that the 
employee or agent either had contact with or knowledge of 
unauthorized persons on the premises. 
R. not stamped btwn 860 & 861 (emphasis added). In his deposition, Bryant reiterated 
that "[Howe] had met the elements of this statute by claiming that there was a guard on 
scene and that the guard had contact with suspects, which he knew to be false." (R. 2147) 
Defendants have not established and cannot establish that either of these two 
pieces of information is materially false. On the contrary, the undisputed facts show 
these statements were materially true. A "private guard responder," as defined by Salt 
Lake City's own "verified response" ordinance, was on the scene; and the "private guard 
responder" had "knowledge of unauthorized persons on the premises." (See R. 1906-09, 
1939-40, 2054, 2273-75) Bryant essentially admitted the immateriality of the alleged 
"misinformation," testifying it was not reckless of Howe, based on the information he 
had, to elicit a police response, and that the police "may have responded anyway." 
(R. 2153, p. 114, 112-25) 
Aside from the issue of materiality, Defendants have not established that they had 
a reasonable basis to conclude Jeff Howe knew the verification of the alarm did not come 
from a Peak Alarm guard. As Howe explained to Officer Wihongi: 
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Jeff: Okay. What originally happened was I had a 
dispatcher telling me that there was kids out on 
a site that was visually confirmed and that -
Wihongi: The call came in how -
Jeff: No, this is my dispatcher talking to me. She 
goes, we have some kids at West High and that 
they are, you know - it's been visually 
confirmed that there's kids at West High, and I 
tried to contact the police department, they 
would not respond. What do you want me to 
do? That's when 1 made the call quickly and 
then 1 said it was a guard because on 90 percent 
of the alarms we actually send a guard out, and 
I should have asked my dispatcher a little bit 
more information which 1 didn't, and the 
dispatcher should have told me no, it was a 
teacher not our guard that actually did the visual 
confirmation, so that was my error. 
(R. 835-36) This is an eminently reasonable explanation, and while Defendant Bryant 
may not have been required to give it controlling weight, he did not give it any weight 
because he did not even consider it. (R. 2150-51, p. 104, I 14 -/?. 106, i 16) 
Defendants now attempt to create additional bases for probable cause, long after 
the fact. They argue, for example, that Officer Wihongi and Sergeant Bryant "both 
concluded that when Howe reported a burglary in progress to police dispatch, he knew 
that his report was false." {See Appellees1 Brief, pp. 6-7) Indeed, they say Plaintiffs' 
contrary statement of fact is "blatantly false." (See Appellees' Brief, p. 8, objecting to 
Statement of Fact Paragraph 67 in Appellant's Brief, stating that "Officer Wihongi 
testified that he did not conclude and has no evidence that when Howe reported a 
burglary in progress that morning he knew it was false.") With all due respect, the record 
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is quite clear, and it is Defendants who get it wrong. Not only is Defendants' recent 
assertion inconsistent with what Sergeant Bryant previously said he relied on in making 
his probable cause determination; it is also contrary to Officer Wihongi's clear testimony 
that neither had any evidence to this day that Jeff Howe knew there was no burglary in 
7 
progress at West High School that morning. 
3. Plaintiffs raised genuine issues of material fact as to the 
existence of probable cause. 
Even assuming Defendants had met their prima facie burden, that would just mean 
the burden then shifted back to Plaintiffs to raise genuine issues of material fact. Neither 
the trial court nor Defendants reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to 
Plaintiffs and demonstrated there is no such issue. In determining whether Defendants 
eliminated any genuine issue of material fact and the trial court's taking this case from 
6
 Officer Wihongi testified as follows: "Q. Do you have any evidence, as you sit here 
today, that when Jeff Howe reported a burglary in progress that morning he knew it was 
false? . . . A. I do not know. Q. You don't have any evidence, as you sit here today, that 
that's the case, do you? A. No, I do not have any evidence. Q. What you do have is 
evidence that says Jeff Howe told dispatch that there was a guard there, a Peak Alarm 
guard, and that turned out not to be true, right? A. That's correct." (R. 2076, p. 82, I. 14 
~ p. 83, I 2) 
7
 Defendants similarly try to make something of Howe's statement that there was an 
"actual break-in." Even if Howe had mischaracterized as a "burglary in progress" or an 
"actual break in" what Defendants admit, with hindsight, was at least a case of criminal 
trespass, the question is, what other citizens have they prosecuted, or what other 
dispatchers have they disciplined, for that kind of a "false report"? The answer is, none. 
(See R. 2228-34) Defendants' belated attempt to bolster the original bases of their 
probable cause determination thus only raises additional questions of material fact about 
whether they singled out Jeff Howe for prosecution as part of their broader political 
campaign. 
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the jury was justified, it is important to emphasize that "[tjhe issue of probable cause is 
preeminently a jury question . . . ." Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151, 159 
(Utah 1991). 
This Court stated in a similar case involving an appeal from a trial court's grant of 
judgment notwithstanding a verdict against defendants on a malicious prosecution claim: 
In approaching a realistic analysis of the present situation, it 
is of prime significance that the occurrences upon which the 
claimed full disclosure is based took place outside the 
plaintiffs presence, and furthermore, were carried on and are 
now testified to by witnesses whose interests are adverse to 
him. Under such circumstances it would be contrary to 
reason and justice to foreclose plaintiff from disputing their 
version of what happened on the ground that their evidence 
was 'undisputed.' At the disadvantage of being absent when 
the events took place, the only course open to plaintiff was to 
expose weaknesses in their story by cross examination or 
contrary evidence to show uncertainties, inconsistencies or 
other circumstances which would cast doubt upon the 
truthfulness of their declarations and support his contention 
that the prosecution was motivated by personal animus and 
vindictiveness, rather than legal justification. The inquiry to 
be pursued, is whether under the evidence, plaintiff succeeded 
in casting sufficient doubt upon the defendants' story that 
reasonable minds could fairly reject it. 
Cottrell v. Grand Union Tea Co., 299 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1956). 
A very similar fact pattern exists in this case. Contemporaneous recordings exist 
of the original call from Ms. Hoyt, the original call from Peak Alarm to police dispatch, 
and Howe's subsequent conversations with dispatch and Officer Wihongi. In making his 
probable cause determination, however, Bryant never listened to those tapes. Instead, he 
relied on Wihongi's necessarily incomplete (and itself demonstrably inaccurate) written 
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report of the incident, embellished with Defendant Werner's editorializations (later 
abjured in her deposition) as to Jeff Howe's credibility, and engaged in the briefest of 
conversations with the prosecutor, the contents of which neither he nor the prosecutor can 
recall. Although Howe volunteered to discuss the matter personally, Bryant and Werner 
refused, and his reasonable explanations for his mistakes, again fully set forth in the 
contemporaneous recordings, were omitted from Wihongi's report, ignored by Bryant 
and dismissed as "mistruths" by Werner. Due to their longstanding advocacy of'Verified 
response," and the clear record of animus against the private alarm industry generally and 
Peak Alarm, Jeff Howe and Jerry Howe personally, Bryant and Werner obviously had 
interests adverse to Plaintiffs. 
Thus, Defendants proceeded with a groundless charge and prosecution - which all 
the evidence suggests was not to bring an offender to justice, but to fulfill a longstanding 
ambition to send a powerful message to an industry that publicly opposed the City's 
position on 'Verified response." As in the Cotrell case, the only course open to Plaintiffs 
under these circumstances is to have their day in court in a civil action where they can 
make and support their fundamental contention: "that the prosecution was motivated by 
personal animus and vindictiveness, rather than legal justification." As in that case, "the 
inquiry to be pursued is whether under the evidence, [Plaintiffs] succeeded in casting 
sufficient doubt upon the defendants1 story that reasonable minds could fairly reject it." 
That inquiry was improperly foreshortened by the trial court's injudicious grant of 
summary judgment. Plaintiffs are entitled to present the evidence to a jury for its 
16 
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determination of whether a reasonable person could conclude, under all the facts and 
circumstances, that anything Jeff Howe reported to police dispatch was knowingly false. 
II. DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENTS DO NOT CORRECT OR RENDER 
HARMLESS THE CLEAR ERROR COMMITTED BY THE TRIAL 
COURT IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS' STATE LAW CLAIMS. 
A. Plaintiffs Argued Below That Their Notice of Claim Complies 
With the UGIA. 
In Appellant's Brief, Plaintiffs showed that their Notice of Claim, which was duly 
served within one year of Jeff Howe's arrest, timely and fully apprised Defendants of the 
gravamen of Plaintiffs' claims and otherwise complied with the UGIA. Defendants argue 
that Plaintiffs failed to even raise with the trial court that their Notice of Claim complies 
with the "fraud or malice" requirement, and cannot raise that argument for the first time 
on appeal. That argument, like Defendants' position and the trial court's conclusion that 
Plaintiffs' Notice of Claim did not claim "fraud or malice" with sufficient specificity, is 
both factually incorrect and a classic elevation of form over substance that runs directly 
counter to this Court's teaching in Mecham v. Frazier, 2008 UT 60. 
Plaintiffs argued the sufficiency of the "fraud or malice" allegations in their Notice 
of Claim both in their pleadings and at oral argument below. In their Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs showed that their 
Notice of Claim sets forth Plaintiffs' claim that individual Defendants, including Werner 
and Bryant, engaged in "the intentional doing of a wrongful act, or the failure to act, 
without just cause or excuse," and argued that such conduct gives rise to liability 
"[rjegardless of whether the standard is willful misconduct or malice." (R. J989 and 
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page not numbered between R. 1989 and R. 1990) In their Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs similarly argued: 
"Defendants next assert that Plaintiffs' notice of claim failed to sufficiently allege malice 
or fraud . . . . [T]he notice of claim need not contain the specificity that Defendants 
assert." (R. 2559) Finally, at oral argument, Plaintiffs discussed at length why their 
Notice of Claim sufficiently apprised Defendants of their claims of malice - and the trial 
court asked a specific question in that regard. (See R. 2746 at p. 56, I. 14 -p. 60, I. 15) 
The record therefore shows that Plaintiffs are not making this argument for the first time. 
Defendants' argument that, even if timely, Plaintiffs' Notice of Claim does not 
sufficiently allege "fraud or malice," must also fail. It is true that Plaintiffs argued their 
Notice meets the statutory definition of "willful misconduct," but that is also the legal 
definition of malice. See Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) (defining "malice" as 
"[t]he intent, without justification or excuse, to commit a wrongful act"). Since the 
definitions of "willful misconduct" and "malice" are the same, and since the case law 
cited in Appellants' Brief makes it clear that no "magic words" are needed (and even if 
they were needed, they were used here), Defendants' arguments about the adequacy of 
Plaintiffs' Notice of Claim, which do not contain any citation to case law and do not 
attempt to distinguish or even address the case law discussed in Appellants' Brief, fail to 
rescue the trial court's clearly erroneous ruling on this issue. 
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B. The Trial Court Did Not Dismiss the False Arrest Claim as 
Barred by the Statute of Limitations, and Defendants' 
Arguments Fail to Show That as an Alternative Basis or 
"Harmless Error" 
Defendants next argue that the trial court's error is harmless because the only 
claims dismissed for failure to comply with the UG1A (False Arrest/Imprisonment and 
Malicious Prosecution) fail for independent reasons. Defendants first insist that 
Plaintiffs' False Arrest/False Imprisonment claim is time-barred based on an assertion 
that the claim arose on July 29, 2003, when the Information was filed, or, at the latest, on 
July 30, 2003, when Howe entered his not guilty plea. (See Appellees' Brief, pp. 31-34) 
The trial court did not make any such ruling, however, and Defendants fail to show it is 
appropriate for this Court to consider alternative grounds to affirm the dismissal of 
Plaintiffs' claims. See Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, % 20, 52 P.3d 1158 (describing the 
'limited circumstance that an appellate court chooses to affirm on an alternate ground") 
Defendants' argument, even if not procedurally improper, is substantively wrong. 
In Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007), the U.S. Supreme Court reversed a Seventh 
Circuit ruling that the plaintiffs Section 1983 claim against the city and officers for false 
arrest accrued at the time of the arrest, not when the appellate court set aside the 
8 
conviction. Instead, the Court ruled: "Reflective of the fact that false imprisonment 
consists of detention without legal process, a false imprisonment ends once the victim 
8
 This Court reached that same conclusion in Tolman v. Kmart Enter., 560 P.2d 1127, 
1128 (Utah 1977). While Wallace is not directly controlling on this Court, Wallace 
undoubtedly undermines Tolman's rationale. 
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becomes held pursuant to such process - when, for example, he is bound over by a 
magistrate or arraigned on charges." Id. at 389 (emphasis added. 
Relying on the word "arraigned," Defendants assert that Howe's arraignment 
began the limitations period in this case. But the Wallace Court equated "legal process" 
with a warrant, the issuance of which requires an objective adjudication of probable 
cause. Id. at 389. Similarly, in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), the Court 
considered whether an objective adjudication of probable cause is required to detain a 
criminal defendant. Examining the common law history of the Fourth Amendment, the 
Court stated, "At common law it was customary if not obligatory for an arrested person to 
be brought before a justice of the peace shortly after arrest." Id. at 114. The Court 
explained, "The primary motivation for the requirement seems to have been the penalty 
for allowing an offender to escape if he had in fact committed the crime, and the fear of 
liability for false imprisonment, if he had not." Id. at 114 n. 14. 
The fact that Wallace specifically uses the term "arraigned" is of no consequence. 
Wallace and the sources it cites may have simply used the word imprecisely, or may have 
9 
assumed that the arraignment would be preceded by a probable cause determination. 
Alternatively, they may have assumed that the arraignment serves as adequate legal 
9
 The term is commonly misused. "[Attorneys and judges have traditionally used this 
term [arraignment] to describe a defendant's initial appearance before a court." 24 
Moore fs Federal Practice § 605.02(1) {3d ed.) . Even Justice Frankfurter., "fastidious in 
his use of the language," erroneously interchanged the term "arraignment" with "initial 
appearance." 1A C. Wright & A. Leipold, Federal Practice and Procedure § 161 at 126 
n.5. 
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process because in most cases the objective adjudication of probable cause has already 
been made by that time. It is only a rare case, such as this, in which the judicial probable 
cause determination is not made at or before an arraignment because the defendant was 
not arrested on a warrant or indictment and was not detained. In such a case, the statute 
of limitations cannot begin to run until the court has adjudicated probable cause at trial. 
C. Plaintiffs Demonstrated That Defendants Procured the Initiation 
of the Prosecution and Otherwise Set Forth Sufficient Facts to 
Meet the Elements of Malicious Prosecution. 
Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs' Malicious Prosecution claim fails because 
only Bryant, "arguably," could be liable, and Plaintiffs "set forth no admissible evidence 
of malice." (See Appellees' Brief, p. 34) Once again, these are arguments in support of 
rulings the trial court did not make, and based on the authorities discussed above 
Defendants cannot make them for the first time on appeal. These arguments are also 
meritless. Plaintiffs argued, with citations to the case law and the record, that Defendants 
other than Bryant are properly implicated in the malicious prosecution, and also 
adequately adduced evidence of malice. (See Appellant's Brief, pp. 41-42) 
In Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 262 (2006), the plaintiffs alleged that they 
were prosecuted by the Postal Service and Postal Service inspectors in retaliation for their 
political speech. The Court ruled that uan official" who influenced the prosecutorial 
decision but did not himself make it will be liable for retaliatory prosecution if it is shown 
that he "acted in retaliation" and "that he induced the prosecutor to bring charges that 
would not have been initiated without his urging." Id. In addition, civil employees of a 
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police department may also be liable under the same theory. Bryson v. Macy, F. 
Supp. 2d (W.D. Okla. 2009) (forensic chemist employed by a police department is not 
entitled to qualified immunity in malicious prosecution § 1983 case). 
Because of the summary judgment disposition of this case, to succeed on this 
argument, Defendants would have to show that no reasonable juror could conclude that 
they acted in retaliation or induced Howe's prosecution on charges that would not 
otherwise have been brought. However, there are numerous facts supporting the opposite 
conclusion. (See R. 1953-59, 1961-66, 1977-80). Therefore, Defendants were not 
entitled to summary judgment on this issue. Similarly, in their pleadings below, 
summarized in Appellants' Brief, Plaintiffs set forth in great detail the numerous facts 
showing that the individual Defendants personally participated in, set in motion and/or 
recklessly failed to supervise the acts that led to the unlawful prosecution. (See R. 1966-
1973, 1973-77) Defendants' perfunctory, cursory argument contains no discussion of the 
relevant case law, no citations to the record, and no showing of how, construing the facts 
and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the trial 
court could properly conclude Plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claim fails as a matter of 
law, 
III. DEFENDANTS FAIL TO ENGAGE PLAINTIFFS' SUBSTANTIVE 
ARGUMENTS SHOWING THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
GRANTING DEFENDANTS QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
Defendants premise their arguments that the trial court properly granted qualified 
immunity to the individual Defendants on the basis that it was Plaintiffs who were 
22 
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required to allege and prove that Defendants lacked probable cause to cite and prosecute 
Howe. As set forth in Part IA hereof, Plaintiffs on their Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment met their burden of demonstrating Defendants lacked probable cause. 
However, the trial court granted qualified immunity on Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment without even discussing Defendants' burden as to their Motion for Summary 
Judgment, much less demonstrating less how they met that burden. Defendants do 
nothing to remedy this fundamental error in the trial court's extraordinary deployment of 
summary judgment without applying the proper presumptions and burdens. The limited 
arguments Defendants do make are meritless. 
A. Plaintiffs' Malicious Prosecution Section 1983 Claims are 
Properly Analyzed Under the 4th Amendment Prior to Trial. 
Relying on Wallace v. Kato, Defendants assert that the retaliatory prosecution 
Section 1983 claim must be analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment exclusively. 
However, Becker v. Kroll makes it clear that prior to trial, the Fourth Amendment applies 
to this claim. 494 F.3d 904, 914 (10th Cir. 2007). "[T]he relevant constitutional 
underpinning for a claim of malicious prosecution under § 1983 must be the 'Fourth 
Amendment's right to be free from unreasonable seizure.'" Id. (citation omitted). In 
addition, in Albright v. Oliver, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment applies to this claim. 510 U.S. 266, 268-69. Defendants' reliance on 
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Wallace misplaced because Wallace is a false arrest § 1983 claim and because Becker 
was issued five months after it 
B. Plaintiffs' Defamation and Stigma Plus Claims Were Timely. 
Defendants also argue, in another argument that they make for the first time on 
appeal and that was not a ground for the trial court's ruling, that Plaintiffs' defamation 
and stigma plus claims are barred by the statute of limitations and that the statements 
were not particular to the Plaintiffs. While Werner's initial defamatory statements may 
have been subject to the group defamation rule, during discovery, Plaintiffs became 
aware of defamatory comments particular to the Plaintiffs in email correspondence 
12 
among Defendants. In Pratt v. Nelson, defendants in a defamation claim made general 
statements regarding a group and then later made specific reference to the plaintiffs. 
2007 UT 41, K 4, 164 P.3d 366. This Court ruled that though the original comments were 
10
 In addition, Defendants rely on the District Court's decision in Becker, which holding 
was specifically reversed by the Court of Appeals. 494 F.3d at 914. 
11 A stigma plus claim's elements including publication of a false and stigmatizing 
statement and that "some further interest was adversely affected." Gardetto v. Mason, 
854 F. Supp. 1520, 1535 (D. Wyo. 1994). In this case, the trial constituted that "further 
interest," and therefore the statute of limitations as to that claim began to toll at that time. 
In addition, because the tort contains the "further interest" requirement, the statute of 
limitations applicable to malicious prosecution should be applied, not the defamation 
statute. 
12
 Through discovery, Plaintiffs gained access to an email in which Werner falsely stated 
to Chief Dinse, Chief Atkinson and others, "I receive more complaints from Peak Alarm 
customers, than all the other alarm companies put together." (R. 2470) Plaintiffs also 
learned of emails in which Werner referred to Jerry Howe as "stupid" (/?. 2455) and Jeff 
Howe as "that Peak Alarm weasel" (R. 2447). 
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subject to the group defamation rule, because of the later particularized statements, it 
became a jury question as to whether the prior general statements referred to the 
plaintiffs. Id. at f^l| 52, 54, 56. In this case, the defamation claim became actionable upon 
the happening of the particularized statements (the emails) because there is no dispute 
that the emails refer to ascertainable people. When the emails were sent, therefore, 
enough context was given to the prior defamatory statement to understand that Plaintiffs 
were referred to in those statements. Yet, because Plaintiffs did not and could not have 
become aware of the particularized defamatory statements earlier, the discovery rule 
tolled the statute of limitations. See In re Hoopiiaina Trust, 2006 UT 53, ^ | 35, 144 P.3d 
1129. Hence, Plaintiffs are entitled to proceed to the jury on the defamation claims. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants largely fail to address Plaintiffs' showing that the trial court erred 
because Defendants lacked probable cause to charge and prosecute Jeff Howe for making 
a false alarm as a matter of law, and that any question about that must be resolved by a 
jury in light of the totality of circumstances. Defendants' total failure to analyze the facts 
in light of the applicable presumptions and burdens on summary judgment, and the 
paucity of their substantive legal analysis, only highlights the same flaws in the trial 
court's ruling. Plaintiffs respectfully ask that it be reversed. 
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DATED this J ) day of June, 2009. 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH PC 
m E. McDonald 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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